On different cases of copyright “infrigement”

Recently I was asked by my friend Gil Yhuda how my anti-copyright stance works in different “infrigement” cases. Thus far I never bothered to look into those details.

Here they are along with my take:

1. Reproduction ‒ “substantial and material” copying. This “right” restricts free (read ‒ normal) dissemination of a creative work.

2. Distribution ‒ sale, rental, lease, or lending. The “right” is limited by the “first sale doctrine.” But, regardless, it restricts free (read ‒ normal) dissemination of a creative work.

3. Creation of derivatives ‒ translation, musical arrangement, dramatization, fictionalization, motion picture version, sound recording, art reproduction, abridgment, condensation, or any other form in which a work may be recast, transformed, or adapted, such as the transformation of a novel into a motion picture, a second version of a software program is generally considered a derivative work based upon the earlier version. The “right” restricts free (read normal) cultural development upon a creative work.

4. Performance ‒ meaning public performance, which is limited to the: literary works, musical works, dramatic works, choreographic works, pantomimes, motion pictures, and audio visual works. This “right” restricts both free (read ‒ normal) dissemination of and cultural development upon a creative work.

5. Display ‒ which is similar to performance, and controls the public “display” of the following types of works: literary works; musical works; dramatic works; choreographic works; pantomimes; pictorial works; graphical works; sculptural works; and stills (individual images) from motion pictures and other audio visual works. The “right” restricts free (read ‒ normal) dissemination of a creative work, mostly.


I cannot present here my entire argument. It is done in the book, Culture vs. Copyright. Shortly:

1. Preliminary general argument would be: cultural phenomena (that is, any creative work) by very nature is free. Free as in “Freedom,” in full meaning of the word. Two major aspects of this freedom are: freedom to access a work and freedom to build upon a work. These freedoms are natural, thus, neither restriction to them can supposedly be useful for any reason.

2. Main specific argument is: unrestricted but attributed usage of a creative work contributes in its author’s name. It brings him exposure, fame . . . if the work is brilliant enough. And the name is that magic tool which, consequentially, turns the work in money. Restrictions, in this regard, do nothing.

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